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ACCOUNTANTs-LIMITATIONS ON NON-LAWYER TAX
PRACTITIONER-WHAT CONSTITUTES "PRACTICE OF LAW"
Plaintiff, a non-lawyer certified public accountant, prepared
defendant's tax returns for the years 1947 through 1950. In 1948
a large deduction was taken which produced a net loss, whereupon
plaintiff filed for defendant a claim for "carry back" deduction
which was granted. The Commissioner contested the treatment,
claiming that it was not a loss "attributable to the operation of a
trade or business" of defendant, hence not susceptible of "carry
back" treatment. After spending five days of case preparation in
the county law library, plaintiff countered the Commissioner's
contention by citing numerous cases and buttressing his arguments
with a "review of over one hundred cases" on the point of law
involved. As a result of plaintiff's services, the proposed assess-
ment was reduced from $6,280 to $200. Defendant refused to pay
plaintiff's fee of $2,000 on the grounds that the latter had unlaw-
fully practical law. On appeal from a judgment in plaintiff's
favor in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, held, reversed and
remanded. Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P. 2d 619, (App. Dept. Sup.
Ct. L. A. County, Calif., 1954).
This is not the first time the courts have considered whether
an accountant performing tax services is practicing law. From the
position taken in Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.
2d 788 (1951), various definitions of the "practice of law" in
tax matters have developed. In In re Bernard Bercu, 299 N.Y.
728, 87 N.E. 2d 451 (1949), "giving legal opinions in relation
to tax laws.., for compensation" was held to be practicing law.
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E. 2d 27 (1943),
pointed out that "the drafting of documents merely incidental to
work of a distinct occupation is not the 'practice of law,' though
the documents have legal consequences." The Agran case rejected
1954]
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this "incidental" test. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of
America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N.E. 2d 349 (1941), suggested
that the "practice of law" is the "procuring of an agreement...
(for consideration) . . . enabling . . . (one) . . . to control the
negotiations and the litigation that might follow" if the negotia-
tions fail. Perhaps the best definition was hinted at in the principal
case, to-wit: If the law on the point is relatively clear, the layman
would not be "practicing law." Thus, if a "reasonably intelligent
layman (certified public accountant) who is reasonably familiar
with similar transactions" could see a "difficult or doubtful ques-
tion of law" involved, there would be a "practice of law." As
to whether tax law practice is governed exclusively by rules of
United States Courts and Departments, see Petition of Kearney,
...... Fla ....... , 63 So. 2d 630 (1953).
The Agran case went further than previous cases in considering
the effect of certain administrative regulations. 31 CODE FED.
REGS. (1949), subtitle A, § 10.3 (a) (1) (ii), permits certified
public accountants to represent clients before the Treasury Depart-
ment and its branches. But § 10.2(f) states "that nothing in the
regulations in this part shall be construed as authorizing ... (non-
lawyers) ... to practice law." Thus the Agran case supplied the
initial decision on this particular question: Do the Treasury Regu-
lations have the effect of declaring that services performed by an
enrolled agent on federal income tax matters are free from state
restrictions as to the "practice of law"? The court decided that
no such purpose or effect could be ascribed to the Regulations.
It might be contended against the above interpretation that the
Regulations could not have intended to grant representative capac-
ity to certified public accountants in one section and then, in
another, to deprive them, in reality, of the power to serve in any
useful representative capacity. Thus it might be further contended
that the first restrictions of § 10.2(f), by specific enumeration,
embraced, by the principle of noscitur a sociis, all that was to be
included in the general restriction of the last clause of that section
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which applies to the "practice of law." However, unless public
policy added strong support to this interpretation, it seems a bit
strained in view of the plain meaning of the words. The noscitur
a sociis principle wavers in the presence of the "And provided
further" introduction to the last restriction in § 10.2(f).
A possible solution to this problem of "practicing law" is for
the certified public accountant to prepare his client's tax return
(or other tax papers) the same way he would if no restriction
concerning the practice of law were imposed upon him. However,
with the copy which goes to the client, and also with that retained
for the accountant's own files (but not with the Director's copy),
he could attach a statement pointing out the transactions, if any,
on which a controversial or difficult question of law is involved,
and state that in his non-legal opinion, it is correctly treated in the
return. His fee probably should not include charges for time spent
in research on difficult points beyond that customarily devoted to
simpler issues of law. This would not deprive the accountant
of any functions which are legitimately his, and would specifically
renounce any intention of practicing law. The question arises
whether any act which is otherwise a practice of law would cease
to be such merely by labelling it. Such a transmutation seems at
first so facile as to be foreign to any type of legal implementation.
However, "the development of any practical criterion . . . (as to
what constitutes practicing law) . . . as well as its subsequent
application, must be closely related to the purpose for which
lawyers are licensed as the exclusive occupants of their field. That
purpose is to protect the public from the intolerable evils which
are brought upon people by those who assume to practice law
without having the proper qualifications." Gardner v. Conway,
supra. It seems that a statement calling the taxpayers attention
to any difficult question is tantamount, so far as the latter's pro-
tection is concerned, to a flat refusal to consider difficult ques-
tions. The ultimate effect of this solution would be to prevent
forfeiture of true accounting fees where a difficult point of law
1954]
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is incidental to the services, to prevent charges by accountants for
rendering additional service on difficult points of law, and to
inform taxpayers where legal services are needed.
Eddie Smith.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-SEVERANCE-FAILURE OF ORDER GRANTING
SEVERANCE TO INCLUDE NAMES OF PARTIES
Suit for divorce, in which wife joined an action to set aside a
conveyance made by her husband and his partner to the Permian
Oil Corporation. Plaintiff claimed that the deed to the corporation
was made solely to defraud her of community property rights. The
corporation moved for a separate trial of the issues between itself
and plaintiff as authorized by Rule 174(b) of the TEXAS RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE (Vernon, 1948). This motion was granted and
a separate trial was had wherein judgment was rendered for the
defendant corporation. The order of the District Court granting
severance failed to include the names of the husband and his
partner. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment in the severed cause
on grounds that as the order granting severance failed to include
the names of "necessary and indispensable" parties to the suit,
the court was without jurisdiction to proceed. Without citing
authority, the court held that the order granting a separate trial
of the issues between plaintiff and the Permian Oil Corporation
carried with it by implication all necessary and indispensable
parties to the suit who were subject to the jurisdiction of the court
in the case as originally filed. Watson v. Watson, 270 S.W. 2d 298
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
Rule 174(b) of the TExAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE is
adopted unchanged from Federal Rule 42(b) which allows the
court to order separate trials of claims and issues "in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice." FED. R. Cirv. P. 42(b). It is
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manifest in the decisions following the promulgation of the rule
that it is primarily a rule of convenience, and that the courts are
given broad discretion in its application. McGee v. McGee, 237
S.W. 2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.
The controlling reasons for the severance of separate counts or
causes of action are the doing of justice, avoiding of prejudice,
and furtherance of convenience. Utilities National Gas Corp. v.
Hill, 239 S.W. 2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
The court, in its discretion, may order a severance for convenience
only, or may sever for all purposes. The former is interlocutory
and a judgment in regard to the severed issues is not final and
appealable. Wilson v. Ammann and Jordan, 163 S. W. 2d
660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error dism. A severance for all pur-
poses, however, authorizes the court to enter final judgment in the
severed cause without making a final disposition of all of the
issues raised by the original suit. Moran v. Midland Farms Co.,
282 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). The court in the instant
case treated the severance as a severance for all purposes and
allowed appeal from the judgment in the severed cause.
No complaint is made in the principal case as to the action of
the court in granting severance. It is said, however, that the failure
of the order to include the names of necessary and indispensable
parties deprived the court of jurisdiction over those parties and
thereby precluded the rendition of a valid judgment.
An indispensable party is a person who has an interest of such
nature in the controversy that a final decree cannot be made with-
out either affecting their interest or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final determination may be wholly incon-
sistent with equity and good conscience. Shell Development Co. v.
Universal Oil Products Co., 157 F. 2d 421 (3rd Cir. 1946). This
definition as announced in federal decisions has been adopted with
approval by the Texas courts. See Simmons v. Wilson, 216 S.W.
2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). However, Texas courts have
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defined "necessary parties" in substantially the same terms. See
Walsh v. Walsh, 255 S.W. 2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). The
courts have consistently failed to make a distinction between the
two classes of parties. Thus the statement is frequently found that
a valid judgment cannot be rendered in the absence of a party who
is necessary to the suit. This is not a correct statement of the
rule, and has resulted in considerable confusion among the case
law. A valid decree may be rendered although a necessary party
under Rule 39(a) of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may
be absent. Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Corp.,
188 S.W. 2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ref w.m. However, the
lack of an indispensable party would render such judgment void.
See Frumer, "Mutiple Parties and Claims in Texas," 6 Sw. L.J.
135 (1952).
In the instant case, the court held that as the missing parties
were parties to the original action as filed by plaintiff, they re-
mained parties after severance. The fact that the order of sever-
ance failed to expressly name the husband and his partner was
held not to affect the jurisdiction of the person which attached
with their appearance in the original cause. The crux of the prob-
lem presented on appeal seemed to be the possible lack of notice
to the missing parties that a part of the lawsuit in which they were
vitally interested was to be tried separately. The record did not
show whether or not the husband and his partner actually appeared
in the trial of the issues between plaintiff and defendant corpora-
tion. The court, however, correctly reasoned that once the parties
were before the court in the original action, the mere technical
omission of their names in the order granting severance did not
serve to defeat this jurisdiction. If a party has pleaded to an action
or otherwise entered an appearance therein, he is before the court
for all purposes, and is charged with notice of all subsequent
orders and decrees only made therein. Phillips et ux. v. The
Maccabees, 50 S.W. 2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). Being thus
charged with notice of the separate trial, the duty rested upon the
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missing parties to appear therein and protect their interest. Their
failure to meet this duty could in no way operate to invalidate
the judgment rendered therein.
William A. Nobles.
CORPORATIONS-VIOLATION OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHT AS GROUND
FOR CANCELLATION OF STOCK BY DIRECTORS
In April, 1948, the board of directors of defendant corporation
adopted a resolution to issue new stock. The new issue was
discussed at the annual stockholders' meeting of January, 1949,
and the minutes indicate that the stockholders were "satisfied with
the explanation given to them," and approved the new issue. Pur-
suant to the resolution, 511 shares of permanent, non-withdraw-
able stock were subscribed to, paid for, and stock certificates issued
dated December 12, 1952. At the stockholders' meeting of Jan-
uary, 1953, for the first time since 1949, a stockholder inquired
about the increase in permanent stock. At the directors meeting
in May, 1953, purportedly to vindicate the pre-emptive rights of
the stockholders, a resolution was adopted rescinding the action
of the directors at the meeting of April, 1948, and cancelling the
stock issued pursuant thereto. Plaintiffs were among the pur-
chasers of the new stock issue, and filed suit to set aside the
cancellation of stock, permanently to enjoin a special stock-
holders' meeting called for the purpose of giving pre-emptive
rights, and to remove the cloud on the title to their stock.
Held: The corporation cannot now, after all that has transpired,
and after the several stockholders' meetings where the subject was
discussed, lawfully exercise the power to cancel the shares and
order a resale to all the shareholders. Relief sought by plaintiffs




The rationale of the case is not clearly defined, the court just
concluding that, all factors considered, the corporation cannot
cancel the stock. The court apparently based this conclusion upon
the following four factors: (1) since the corporation had authority
to issue the stock, the issue was not ultra vires, and there was no
harm to the corporation in the issuance; (2) the issuance of the
stock, even if attended by irregularities, was not void, and the
subscribers could not have set up the violation of pre-emptive
rights as a defense to an action to enforce payment on their sub-
scriptions; (3) if there has been a violation of pre-emptive rights,
the right of action for redress of the injury belongs to those who
were stockholders at the time of the new issue and they have
brought no action; (4) in this case, in any event, a right to cancel-
lation of the stock was barred by the laches or estoppel of the
corporation or stockholders to assert the invalidity of the stock.
In the opinion, at page 79, the court states the fundamental
question in this case: can the directors cancel the stock previously
issued as a result of the subscription made pursuant to the resolu-
tion of 1948? The only question in this case seems to be the
authority of the directors to undo an act which they have pre-
viously done which is wrongful, and in contravention of a statute.
(Section 1701.40 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that upon
the issue of corporate stock for cash, existing stockholders of that
class shall have a right to subscribe to the new issue in the propor-
tion their holding bears to the total outstanding stock.) The only
reason found by the court for not allowing the cancellation of the
stock which appears relevant to this question is the fourth-laches
or estoppel.
The question of whether there has been a wrong to the corpora-
tion seems irrelevant because the corporation is not suing any-
one, nor is anyone suing the directors for a wrong to the corpora-
tion. That a subscriber to the new stock would have no defense
also appears irrelevant. Commentators have come to the conclusion
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"that the so-called pre-emptive right is not a right at all, but a
remedy . . . and that unless a situation appeared calling for a
remedy and requiring this particular remedy the right should not
necessarily be assumed to exist." Berle, Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). A fortiori, it
would seem that there is nothing in the nature of pre-emptive
rights which makes the issue of stock in violation thereof void;
at the most it is voidable. Pre-emptive rights are for the benefit
of the non-acquiring stockholders, and presumably the acquiring
stockholders would be estopped in the ordinary case from raising
this defense. When the question is viewed in the light as stated
above, it also seems irrelevant that the stockholders have not them-
selves sued to enforce their rights to the stock.
The management of the corporation is reposited in the hands
of the directors, and it would seem that they can change their
minds as they please, so long as there are no intervening rights
of third parties. It has been stated that the directors can rescind
or repeal any previous action of the board unless such rescission
or repeal would involve a breach of contract or disturb a vested
right. Staats v. Biograph Co., 236 F. 454 (2d Cir. 1916). Thus,
there would be a question in any case of cancellation as to whether
the rights of third parties have intervened. But if there is a viola-
tion of pre-emptive rights of such a character that a court of
equity would enjoin issuance or cancel an executed issue, third
persons should not have a legal basis for objection that the direc-
tors have undone their unlawful act without the necessity of judi-
cial coercion. Compare the situation where the corporation in
paying a dividend makes the check out in too large an amount or
makes it payable to the wrong person. Who would challenge the
right of the directors to correct their mistake by stopping pay-
ment on the check without waiting for a court order?
Did the vested rights of third persons intervene in this case?
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of the new issue, then presumably the directors in 1953 were not
redressing an illegal act, and the vested rights of the new stock-
holders do intervene. Of course, a requisite of waiver of a right
is knowledge of the facts creating the right waived. Some of the
facts which must be taken into consideration in determining the
question of laches, estoppel, or acquiescence are whether the com-
plaining stockholders were present at the meeting at which the
new issue was discussed; whether full disclosure of all the facts
relevant to the new issue was made at that meeting; whether the
stockholders had or should have had knowledge of the facts;
whether there was adequate notice given of business to be con-
sidered at the meeting. Insufficient or defective notice renders the
action taken at the meeting voidable at the instance of those who
did not participate. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 171 (Rev. ed.
1946). As a general rule, objections may be made only by injured
stockholders; and notice of meetings, or defects therein, may be
waived, cured by ratification, or objections thereto barred by
laches or estoppel. Attending and participating in a meeting con-
stitute a waiver. Where all the stockholders of a corporation are
estopped, the corporation is likewise estopped. Kearneysville
Creamery Co. v. American Creamery Co., 103 W. Va. 259, 137
S. E. 217 (1927). See the annotation at 51 A.L.R. 941 (1927).
All stockholders are charged with notice of and bound by what was
done at a meeting regularly convened of which they were notified.
Kranich v. Bach, 209 App. Div. 52, 204 N.Y.S. 320 (1924);
Hinds County v. Natchez, J & C. R. R. Co., 85 Miss. 599, 38 S. 189
(1905). The statement of facts by the court is not sufficient to
determine the answer to these problems in the principal case.
Lewis T. Sweet, Jr.
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CORPORATIONS: WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS FOR SERVICE
OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATION
An Ohio corporation, being sued as a third party defendant,
secured an order vacating service of process made on its president
while in New York on vacation. The corporation claimed immunity
on the ground that it was a foreign corporation not doing business
in New York at the time suit was brought. Appellant, a co-defend-
ant, argued that until three years before process was served the
appellee Ohio corporation had an agent who maintained an office
and telephone in its name. Also approximately four years prior
to service the agent had sued in the New York courts using the
name of the appellee. The appellee showed that its contract with
the agent had ended three years before and that since then it had
had no employees or representatives within the State of New York.
The appellee did, however, currently maintain a bank account
in New York for the purpose of establishing credit standing and
for discounting notes received on export matter. Held,' Order va-
cating service affirmed. Knight v. Stockard S.S. Corp. (W. A.
Riddell Corp.), 214 F. 2d 727 (2nd Cir. 1954).
Due process under the Federal Constitution requires that a
foreign corporation must be doing business within the state of
forum to be amenable to process in that jurisdiction. Old Wayne
Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907), People's 'Tobacco
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918). The fact that
an official of the foreign corporation is physically present in the
state is not sufficient to authorize service. Goldey v. Morning News,
156 U.S. 518 (1895). The appellant argued that the appellee was
doing business in New York until its contract with its agent
expired, and that only a "slight amount of business thereafter
done in New York would suffice to keep the appellee present in the
state subject to process." Citing: French v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F. 2d
787 (2nd Cir. 1951).
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In the French case it was held that a corporation would still be
present in the state of forum if service was made shortly after the
ceasing of business activities and if the liability of the corporation
arose out of the events occurring within the state trying to get
jurisdiction. There one month had elapsed from the ceasing of
corporate activities until service, and this was held satisfactory
to uphold service. Newmark v. Abeel, 102 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), involved a similar situation in which there were two years
from the time of suspension of business activities until service and
that length of time was held to be too long to satisfy the rule. In
the Knight case there were three years between the diminishing of
activities in the state and service of process. Following previous
decisions this would seem an unreasonable length of time to hold
the corporation liable to service of process on the basis of its
past activities.
Thus if process is to be sustained in the principal case, it must
be on the basis of present business activity. The test which deter-
mines whether or not a corporation is doing business in a state
so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of its courts is whether its
activities within the state are casual and occasional or systematic
and regular. 18 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 8713 (Perm. Ed.
1933). This test is not easily applied and a result the courts have
consistently recognized that what constitutes doing business is
peculiarly dependent on the facts of the particular case and no
inflexible formula can be applied governing every situation. Oyler
v. J. P. Seebury Corp., 29 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Tex. 1939), Jeter
v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co., 256 P. 2d 130 (Cal. 1930),
New v. Robinson-Houchin Optical Co., 357 Pa. 47, 53 A. 2d
79 (1947).
The United States Court of Appeals in this case held that the
maintenance of a bank account for credit purposes was not suf-
ficient business activity to compel the appellee to respond to suit
in New York State. Although the court cited no cases, this decision
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is well supported by authority. Thus in an early case, a Colorado
corporation which maintained an office for registering stock trans-
fers, held directors meetings, and kept a bank account in New
York was held not to be doing business for the purpose of service
of process in that state. Honeyman v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co.,
133 F. 96 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1904), also see Landaas v. Canister Co.,
69 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), Lichtenberg v. Bullis School,
Inc., 68 A. 2d 586 (D. C. 1949).
It is interesting to note that the PROPOSED TEXAS CORPORATION
ACT deals specifically with this problem. The federal decisions set
up a minimum standard of business activity which must be carried
on in order to meet the Constitutional requirement of due process.
Any state may set its own standard as to what constitutes doing
business as long as it is not lower than the federal standard. The
PROPOSED TEXAS CORPORATION ACT (H. B. No. 27, 53rd Leg.,
Reg. Session (1953)) in Art. 8.01 (B) enumerates a list of activi-
ties which shall not constitute doing business. Included among these
activities is that of maintaining a bank account. As we have seen
from the prior holdings this statute, if passed, would make no




CRIMINAL LAW: DOES PLEA OF GUILTY IN STATE COURT AND
SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION IN FEDERAL COURT FOR THE
SAME ACT CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
Appellant was indicted for burglary and receipt of stolen goods
in Pennsylvania state court in 1950. Two federal indictments were
returned in 1951 charging him with theft of goods from interstate
commerce and the possession thereof under Title 18 U.S.C. § 659,
based on the same acts as were the state indictments. He pleaded
guilty first in the state court and subsequently in the federal court,
but the federal court acted first and sentenced him to imprison-
ment for nine years on each charge. Appellant seeks reversal in
the United States court of appeals, relying inter alia on a provi-
sion of the federal statute: "A judgment of conviction or acquittal
on the merits under the laws of any state shall be a bar to any
prosecution under this section for the same act or acts." Held:
conviction sustained. United States v. Scarlata, 214 F. 2d 807
(3rd Cir. 1954).
The court found the argument of double jeopardy without merit,
saying, "Although a plea of guilty may be a conviction in the
same sense in which a jury verdict is a conviction, a plea of
guilty is not a judgment of conviction." A judgment of conviction
is rendered only by the court, and some sort of court action is
required before the later prosecution would be barred. This result
is in accord with In re Cedar, 269 N.Y. Supp. 733, 240 App. Div.
182 (1934), wherein a judgment of conviction is defined as the
sentence of a court entered into the minutes of that court, consist-
ing of facts judicially ascertained and recorded. The common law,
sans "judgment of conviction," is contra. A plea of guilty to an
indictment with entry on the record is jeopardy. State v. Randolph,
61 Idaho 456, 102 P. 2d 913 (1940). From the moment an
accused is placed on trial on his plea before a duly sworn jury,
jeopardy attaches, and same may be interposed on any subse-
quent trial for the same offense. A plea of guilty is legally the
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same as a verdict of guilty. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
1478 (11th ed. 1935).
The reasoning of the main case, however, turns on the construc-
tion of the seemingly innocuous phrase, "judgment of conviction."
Possibly the scope of the decision should be narrowly limited to
federal statutes of similar import. The statute certainly marks 'a
distinct departure from the Constitutional doctrine of separate
sovereignty of state and federal governments. Assuming jeopardy
in the state court, that jeopardy formerly was no defense to a
subsequent prosecution by the federal government for the same
act which violated both state and federal law, for the same source
of conduct may be an offense against both the state and federal
governments as separate sovereigns. United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377 (1922).
Seemingly the court could have decided the principal case on
other grounds. The immunity from second jeopardy granted by
the Constitution is a personal privilege which the accused may
waive, expressly or impliedly. So an accused waives his Con-
stitutional right to claim double jeopardy by pleading guilty.
Bracey v. Zerbst, 93 F. 2d 8 (10th Cir. 1937). See also Berg v.
United States, 176 F. 2d 122 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 876.
Although on the facts of the principal case subsequent prose.
cution was not barred since there had been no "judgment of con-
viction" in the state court, the strong intimation of the court is
that it is acceding to the Congressional intent to abolish the sepa-
rate sovereignty doctrine in the federal courts. But in the absence
of state statute or state constitutional provision to the contrary,
the state court still can successfully prosecute the defendant on
his guilty plea, whether he was convicted or acquitted in the
federal court. Could Congress have intended such a result? Might
not this lead to collusion between state and federal prosecutors?
Certainly the constitutional difficulties that Congress would meet
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in attempting to bind both state and federal courts to previous
judgments of conviction or acquittal would be insuperable. The
solution might be for the legislatures of the various states to pass
similar statutes barring prosecution in the state courts after con-
viction or acquittal in the federal courts. Some states have enacted
statutes of like import. See for example, Section 2290, OKLA.
COMP. STAT. § 2290 (1921).
Lee Williams.
INCOME TAX-CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM-
FAILURE OF WITNESS TO BRING FORTH COPIES CONSTITUTED
CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS
Defendant, as a witness before a Senate investigating subcom-
mittee, failed to produce his retained copies of specified income
tax returns in response to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the
subcommittee. In a prosecution for contempt of Congress, the
federal district court held defendant guilty. United States v.
O'Mara, 122 F. Supp. 399 (D.D.C. 1954).
Income tax returns filed with the Commissioner constitute public
records; however, examination of the returns may only take place
on Presidential order and under rules prescribed by the Secretary
with the President's approval. INT. REV. CODE § 55(a) (1). By
interpreting the applicable statutory section, Judge Holtzoff deter-
mined, in a debatable decision, that the limited statutory privilege
does not include the taxpayer's own copies.
The opinion referred to the oft-cited case, Connecticut Im,.
porting Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 1 F.R.D. 190 (D.
Conn. 1940). In a civil action the court ruled the defendant was
entitled to inspect the plaintiff's retained copies of income tax
returns. These retained copies constituted communications from
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the taxpayer to the government, but nevertheless "are without
privilege either at common law or under statute." Because the
retained copies lie outside the limited statutory privilege, their
status is similar to that of the other items of admissible evidence.
This view is in accord with the prevailing majority view in
civil proceedings. The applicable section of the code only covers
disclosure by governmental officers and employees having control
of original documents; copies of returns remaining in the hands
of taxpayers are not privileged. Samish v. Superior Court, 28
Cal. App. 2d 685, 83 P. 2d 305 (1938). One court has stated
the proposition that where the taxpayer has no copies, he can be
required to inspect his original returns in the Bureau office and
then to produce the required copies. FED. R. Civ. P. 34, Reeves v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1948). Copies of
income tax returns are held not privileged by most courts. Nola
Electric, Inc. v. Reilly, 11 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
There is a minority view that retained copies can not be intro-
duced as evidence. An early opinion found reversible error for
admitting as evidence unsigned copies of federal income tax
returns upon the ground that their reception violated the "best-
evidence" rule. Before copies are admissible is must be proven
that the original documents can not be produced; this could not
be shown as originals are in governmental custody and available
when needed. Corliss v. United States, 7 F. 2d 455 (8th Cir.
1925). The leading minority opinion holds income tax returns
are, in private civil actions, confidential information between the
taxpayer and the government and not open to inspection; other
district court rulings requiring production of returns were stated
not to bind this court. O'Connell v. Olsen and' Ugelstadt, 10
F.R.D. 142 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
United States v. O'Mara is an opinion of first impression in that
a Congressional subcommittee is the organ subpoenaing copies of
income tax returns. With the majority of our courts holding that
1954)
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these documents can be subpoenaed in civil litigation, the court
drew an analogy to civil action results in allowing the returns to
be subpoenaed. The power of Congress to punish a private citizen
for contempt when such individual fails to produce the requested
pertinent documents was available. 52 STAT. 942, 2 U.S.C. 192
(1938); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1925). The pre-
dominate view in civil litigation is well supported by sound rea-
soning. Subpoenaing copies is the only feasible way in which re-
turns may be produced to meet the demands of the particular suit.
However under § 55(d) (1) of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
Congressional committees are given another manner in which such
returns may be procured. On securing an Executive Order from
the President, an authorized investigation committee may inspect
the original returns in the Commissioner's office. Three such orders
were issued in 1952. Because this suitable statutory method is
provided, it is submitted that the court should have followed the
"best-evidence" rule and required Congressional committees to
obtain the original filed returns instead of allowing the individual
taxpayer's copies to be subpoenaed. Such a course of action would,
in addition to complying with the "best-evidence" rule, avoid any





CAPTIVE AUDIENCE DOCTRINE-No SOLICITATION RULE-
EMPLOYER'S FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The management of a retail department store made speeches
to its employees during working hours on the subject of a forth-
coming union election. All of the employees left the store by one
exit. The union hall was located one and a half blocks from the
store. The store applied a no solicitation rule at all times. A
request by the union for equal speaking time was denied on the
basis of the no solicitation rule. The speeches of the management
had been found to contain no threat of reprisal or promise of
benefit so as to take them out of the protection of Section 8(c)
of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT. Held, the speeches of the
management did not constitute an unfair labor practice though
coupled with a refusal of equal speaking time to the union.
National Labor Relations Board v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.
2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954).
The Board first held that a captive audience was unlawful per se.
Clark Brothers, 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946). After Congress, ex-
pressly condemning the Clark case, amended the NLRA with Sec-
tion 8(c), the Board reversed itself. The Babcock and Wilcox Co.,
77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948). Later the Board reverted in part to its
prior ruling and held that when a broad rule against solicitation
is enforced an employer cannot discriminatorily violate it. Bonwit
Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
A no solictation rule was held unlawful when applicable to free
time. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
But a no solicitation rule applicable to free time was upheld in
the case of department stores due to the nature of the business.
Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948). It was the com-
bination of such a broad but privileged no solicitation rule and a
refusal to the union of equal facilities on which the decision in the
Bonwit Teller case was based. The principle of equal facilities
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was extended to cases in which there was no rule against solicita-
tion. Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953).
But the Board has held since the principal case that the employer
may deny equal facilities even though he enforces a rule against
union solicitation, provided that the rule does not apply to non-
working time. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. NO. 109
(Dec. 17, 1953).
In allowing the employer in the principal case to enforce a no
solicitation rule at all times without granting the union an equal
opportunity to address the employees the Circuit Court laid special
emphasis on the ease with which the union might contact the
employees off the premises and on the employer's right to freedom
of speech, guaranteed under the Constitution and doubly empha-
sized in Section 8 (c). But the Board in the Livingston case limited
the employer's right to enforce a no solicitation rule to working
hours only without consideration of the opportunity the union
might have in the individual case for contacting the employees
off the premises. The decision of the Circuit Court thus further
broadens the rule as modified by the Board as to the permissible





LABOR LAW: IN CERTAIN EXCEPTED SITUATIONS STATES MAY
STILL ASSERT THEIR JURISDICTION OVER LABOR CONTROVERSIES
FALLING WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE N.L.R.B.
Petitioner was engaged in interstate commerce and therefore
within the provisions of the Taft-Hartley and Wagner Acts, U.S.C.
Title 29, § 141 et seq. He sought an injunction against the defend-
ant union to restrain picketing of his place of business. The picket-
ing had been accompanied by violence, and there was the threat
of that violence being continued by the union. Defendant union
answered that the petitioner was without a cause of action in the
state court due to the construction of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts that had been promulgated by the U. S. Supreme Court in
Garner et al. v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union
No. 776 (AFL) et al., 346 U. S. 485 (1953), to the effect that
Congress had precluded the states from asserting their jurisdic-
tion over these matters and had given the power of investigation,
hearing, and decision exclusively to the National Labor Relations
Board. The court granted the injunction against the union and,
pointed out that while the now famous Garner case did preclude
the states from asserting their jurisdiction in labor controversies
involving businesses engaged in interstate commerce, it did not
prevent the states from exercising their police power to enjoin
such picketing when it was accompanied by violence or a con-
tinuing threat of violence. Douglas Public Service Corp. et al. v.
Gaspard et al., 74 So. 2d 182 (La. 1954).
In writing the unanimous opinion in the Garner case, the late
Mr. Justice Jackson made provision for this exception when he
stated:
We have held that the state may still exercise "its historic powers
over such traditionally local matters as public safety. .. "
When ordinary peaceful picketing is used, then by the rule of
the Garner case, the complainant should take his petition to the
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National Labor Relations Board for its exclusive consideration
and decision. Building Trades Council et al. v. Kinard Construc-
tion Co., 346 U. S. 933 (1954), Your Food Stores of Santa Fe Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Local No. 1565, 121 F. Supp. 339 (D.N. M.
1954). However, when violence or a threat of violence to human
life and property accompanies these controversies, the various
states are not precluded from asserting their police power to pro-
tect the public and to prevent the occurrence of the violence.
Irving Subway Grating Inc. v. Silverman et al., 117 F. Supp. 671,
(E.D.N.Y. 1953), Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electri-
cal Radio and Machine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740 (1942).
The fundamental reasoning underlying this exception to the
rule of the Garner case is found perhaps in the basic premise,
that even though Congress desires that there be uniformity in the
law of labor relations and that such can only be secured by grant-
ing exclusive jurisdiction in the field, this interest must yield to
the duty of the states to protect their citizens from harm and prop-
erty destruction. The proposition that the states either cannot or
should not be precluded from asserting their police power in such
situations is given some support by Morgan's S. S. Co. v. Louisi-
ana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455 (1886), which held a state
quarantine law valid as a protection of its citizens' health irre-
spective of the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
Joe H. McCracken III.
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TRUSTS-SUPERVISION BY THE COURTS AND DISCRETIONARY
POWERS OF THE TRUSTEE
Testamentary trustees filed a bill in equity to secure a decree
declaring that the trustees had the power to bind ultimate remain-
dermen of the trust estates and an insane life tenant to a twenty-
five year lease that would extend beyond the probable terms of
the trusts. The ultimate remaindermen consisted of infants. An
alternative prayer was entered asking that the court ratify and
approve the action of the trustees in entering into the lease agree-
ment for the above term of years. In reversing the court of appeals
and affirming the Chancellor, the Supreme Court stated that the
trustees did not have the authority to make the lease without the
approval of the court. However, a term of twenty-five years was
approved as the most desirable period for the best interests of all.
The court rejected the specific lease in question, preferring a
renewal lease not made by the trustees. The Chancellor was di-
rected to order the trustees to repudiate the lease agreement made
by them and execute the renewal lease approved by the court.
Nashville Trust Company et al. v. Lebeck, ...... Tenn ........ 270 S.W.
2d 470 (1954) (3.2 decision).
It appears that the majority was controlled largely by the fact
that the beneficiaries were infants. The court pointed out the
failure of the court of appeals to give due consideration to the
inherent jurisdiction of the Chancery Court in dealing with the
administration of trust estates, especially where the interests of
minors and lunatics were concerned. The Chancellor stands in
loco parentis to infants and lunatics with reference to the disposi-
tion of their property and must consider their best interests. He
has authority to make a lease contract in some instances, and in
this case he acted with only the manifest interest of the parties in
mind. The court stated the broad principle that "a court of equity
will watch over the administration and execution of a trust and
see that the interest of all parties is protected, as far as it can be
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done consistently with the rules of law and of equity, and fairness
to all concerned." The trustees were estopped to deny the court's
power to approve of the lease in this case for they had specifically
asked for such approval in their alternative prayer.
A strong dissent pointed out that the majority had strayed from
the law of Tennessee and from a well established law of trusts.
See Note, 8 L.R.A. (n.s.) 398 (1907). The trustees had the dis-
cretion to lease the property under the wills creating the trust,
and the court should not have substituted its judgment for that of
the trustees unless bad faith or a gross and arbitrary abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the trustees was shown. The leading Tennes-
see case on the point states that a "trustee having the power to
exercise discretion will not be interfered with by the court so long
as he is acting bona fide. To do so would be to substitute the
discretion of the court for that of the trustee." Smith v. Fleisch,
4 Tenn. App. 139, 147 (1926). On the point of estoppel the dis-
sent asserts that the majority misconstrued the alternate prayer
seeking approval of the term of the lease and not approval of the
lease itself.
The general rule in this type case is stated in 2 SCOTT, LAW
OF TRUSTS § 187 (1939):
Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the
exercise of a power, the court will not interfere with him in his exercise
or failure to exercise the power so long as he is not guilty of an abuse
of his discretion.... The mere fact that if the discretion had been con-
ferred upon the court, the court would have exercised the power differ-
ently is not a sufficient reason for interfering with the exercise of the
power by the trustee.
It is doubtful if the well established rule has been abrogated.'
It appears that this case stands as an exception to the rule and this




WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY ARISING OUT OF
EMPLOYMENT-ACT OF GOD
Employee was killed while being transported by employer from
place of employment to employer-furnished sleeping quarters when
a sudden storm upset the truck in which the employee was riding.
In action brought by decedent's wife under the workmen's com-
pensation statute, WILLAMS TENNESSEE CODE, § 6851 et seq., trial
court allowed recovery. On appeal, held: reversed and petition
dismissed. Injuries resulting from act of God compensable only
if resulting from danger not common to general public and
peculiar to employment or if injury could have been reasonably
contemplated by employer at time of hiring. Jackson v. Clark &
Fay, Inc. et al.. ...... Tenn ....... 270 S.W. 2d 389 (1954). (3-2
decision).
It was conceded that the plaintiff was in the course of employ-
ment at the time of his death; however, the majority of the court
felt that the determinative question was whether this injury and
resulting death arose "out of his employment." A two-pronged
test to determine the "out of his employment" question was used
to determine the liability: (1) Was the danger of being injured
by a storm while traveling to and from his work in a truck along
a public highway a danger peculiar to Jackson's work?, and
(2) Could such injury reasonably have been contemplated if it
had been thought of at the time of the employment as a risk inci-
dent to Jackson's duties?
In answer to the first test, the court relied upon a line of cases
based on In re Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation, Limited.
In re McNicol et al. In re Patterson, Wilde & Co., 215 Mass. 497,
102 N. E. 697 (1913), holding a causal connection must:exist
between the conditions under which the work is required to be per-
formed and the resulting injury. In following this tort formula
of recovery rather than the normal all inclusive statutory coverage
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of the workmen's compensation act, the court seemingly refutes its
own holdings that the agreement between employer and employee
under this act is in the nature of an insurance contract, Hughes
v" Elliot, 162 Tenn. 188, 35 S.W. 2d 387 (1930); and that the
act is to be construed liberally in the claimant's favor. Maxwell v.
Beck, 169 Tenn. 315, 87 S.W. 2d 564 (1935); Brown v. Birming-
ham, 173 Tenn. 343, 117 S.W. 2d 739 (1938).
The foreseeability requirement would apply a retroactive test.
The court was forced to this position in an attempt to resolve a
split in prior cases distinguished on rather weak grounds. See:
Scott v. Shinn, 171 Tenn. 478, 105 S.W. 2d 105 (1937); Carter
v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W. 2d 211 (1939). The Tennessee
statute itself requires no tests of foreseeability, direct causal con-
nection or proximate cause except in the case of occupational
disease (WILLIAM'S TENN. CODE § 6852d) but the application
of these principles is felt necessary due to prior decisions. The
court specifically points out on the motion for rehearing that a
change in the test would have to be brought about by legislative
enactment.
The Tennessee act has no specific clause relating to act of God
situations. In contrast the Texas act (VERNON'S TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. (1925) art. 8309 § 1) provides recovey only if the duties
being peformed by the employee subject him to a greater hazard
than ordinarily confronts the general public and states that
determination of this is a question of fact for the jury. See fur-
ther comprehensive note in 16 TEX. L. REV. 130.
The dissent reasoned that such fine distinctions as lay the
premise for the majority holding should not govern. If the negli-
gence of the truck driver had caused the injury, recovery would
have been allowed as a matter of course. The act of God feature
should not be given overriding influence, but rather a determina-
tion of "in the course of employment" alone should determine
[V61. a
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the result. This dissent cites with approval the following definition
of "arising out of employment:" "An injury arises out of employ-
ment-if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or inci-
dents of the employment; in other words, out of employment
looked at in any of its aspects." Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500,
26 N.E. 2d 328, 330 (1940). This latter definition would appear
to be the modern rule and more in harmony with the intent of the
workmen's compensation statutes.
Henry Baer.
